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1. INTRODUCTION 
The debate on the competition-risk nexus recurs in every financial crisis. “The legislative reforms 
adopted in most countries as a response to the banking and financial crises of the 1930s – Padoa-
Schioppa (2001, p.14) states –, shared one basic idea which was that, in order to preserve the 
stability of the banking and financial industry, competition had to be restrained.” In modern banking 
literature, this common belief has evolved into the charter value paradigm (Keeley 1990; Hellmann 
et al., 2000). According to this theory, if depositors (or the deposit insurance authority) do not 
observe the riskiness of bank’s asset portfolio, bank’s shareholders (and managers) have an 
incentive to take excessive risks, exploiting limited liability. Monopoly rents in imperfectly 
competitive credit markets mitigate this incentive, making banks relatively conservative in order to 
preserve their charter value (i.e. the discounted value of their expected future profits).1  
The crucial hypothesis to obtain a negative trade-off between competition and bank financial 
fragility is that banks fully control the risk level of their asset portfolio. Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) 
reexamined this trade-off by reversing the assumption on the risk controller: banks set the lending 
rate, while the borrowers choose the risk level of funded projects and, thus, of the bank loan 
portfolio. Using a Cournot model with information asymmetries about the risk level of firms’ 
investment projects, Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) show that firms have an incentive to shift risk on 
banks that is all the greater the higher is the loan interest rate (risk-shifting paradigm). Thus, when 
banks’ market power and loan rates increase, firms tend to choose risky projects and, if probability 
of default is correlated across borrowing firms, the banks’ financial fragility increases.  
A number of papers have reconciled charter value and risk-shifting paradigm by assuming that 
loan default probabilities are imperfectly correlated (Martinez-Miera and Repullo 2010), that banks 
are able to choose the optimal degree of default correlation in their loan portfolio (Hakenes and 
Schnabel 2011) or that both banks and firms can affect the riskiness of loan portfolio (Wagner 
2010). In these cases, a non-monotonic U-shaped relationship between competition and bank risk 
emerges: in very competitive markets, the effect of low intermediation margins on good loans 
dominates the risk-shifting effect and further competition increases the probability of bank failure, 
while in very concentrated markets, the risk-shifting effect due to bad loans dominates and a new 
entry reduces the risk of banks’ loan portfolio and, hence, the probability of bank failures. 
Conflicting theoretical predictions have fed a growing strand of empirical research on the 
relationship between banking competition and financial stability. Findings are mixed, varying with 
the sample, econometric model, and risk and competition measures considered in the analysis. 
Empirical evidence from cross-country analyses supports both paradigms. Beck et al. (2006) 
document that concentration of credit markets is negatively associated with the probability of 
banking crises. In contrast, Boyd et al. (2006) and De Nicolò and Loukoianova (2007) consider 133 
developing countries and provide support for the risk-shifting paradigm, finding that concentration 
in credit markets feeds bank risks and that this relationship is stronger when asset composition and 
bank ownership (private vs state-owned and foreign vs domestic) are taken into account. Fiordelisi 
and Marè (2014) show that the soundness of European cooperative banks is positively influenced by 
the degree of bank competition and find that risk-shifting paradigms holds also during the 2007–
2009 financial crisis. Berger et al. (2009) estimate a quadratic model on a large sample of banks 
from developed countries: they document an inverted U-shape relationship between bank risk and 
market power, in line with Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010). Similar results are obtained by 
Tabak et al. (2012) for Latin America. 
These studies identify an average relationship between bank competition and bank risk that 
could be strongly heterogeneous across countries. For example, Beck et al. (2013) estimate a model 
in which bank market power competition, as measured by the Lerner index, is related to bank 
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 Further arguments in favour of the competition-fragility nexus are that fiercer bank competition also disincentives 
relationship lending and borrower screening, again increasing banking risk (Allen and Gale 2004). 
  
soundness, as measured by Altman Z-score. Their findings show that on average the charter value 
paradigm dominates the risk-shifting hypothesis, but they reveal a significant cross-country 
heterogeneity in the competition-stability relationship.  
The limits of the cross-country approach have spurred research at the country level. Most 
studies find evidence in favour of the charter value theory. For example, a positive nexus between 
interbank competition and bank financial fragility has been documented for the US (Keeley 1990; 
Demsetz et al. 1996; Brewer and Saidenberg 1996), Spain (Salas and Saurina 2003; Jiménez et al. 
2013) and Germany (Buch et al. 2013; Kick and Prieto 2015). Only few papers lend some support to 
the risk-shifting paradigm. In particular, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) show that the US state 
branching liberalisation in the 1980s lowered loan losses, while Boyd et al. (2006), analyzing a 
cross-section of US banks in 2003, find that the probability of bank failure is positively related to 
bank concentration.  
In this paper, we examine the competition-risk nexus in the Italian banking system from 2006 to 
2010 using data by the Italian Banking Association. The focus on Italy and global crisis period is 
interesting for different reasons. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is first study on the bank 
competition-risk nexus in Italy. During the last decades, the Italian banking system has experienced 
an intense process of consolidation and privatization and major regulatory transformations. The 
total number of banks has gradually decreased from 1156 in 1990 to 592 banks (plus 79 foreign 
branches) in 2014.2 A strong process of spatial diffusion of banks has accompanied the 
consolidation process across regions. The number of branches has steadily increased until 2008, and 
then slightly decline in response to the financial crisis: the average population served by a bank 
branch was equal to 2278 in 1997, 1734 in 2008 and 1979 at the end of 2014. On the whole, the 
degree of interbank competition has intensified even if it remains lower than in other countries and 
strongly differentiated across regions (Angelini and Cetorelli 2003; Coccorese 2004, 2014; 
Drummond et al. 2007). In addition, Italy is a country of small firms financed by small banks 
(Alessandrini et al. 2009). This means that only a very few banks are too-big-to-fail banks3 and that 
firms have few alternatives to bank funding financial, mitigating concerns for these two potential 
sources of confounding of the competition-risk nexus.  
Second, the inclusion of both (equally weighted) tranquil and crisis periods in the sample allows 
to address the concern of measuring bank risk ex post and not ex ante as required by theoretical 
models. Controlling for a global shock that hits across banks weakens biases due to a non-random 
realization of risks taken ex-ante that is not captured by the observed variables. In other words, the 
shock of the financial crisis is so intense and generalized across banks that once controlled for it, the 
omitted variable concern becomes minor and estimates are more accurate and consistent. Moreover, 
in crisis periods it is likely that incentives to shift risks from firms to banks, such as in Boyd and De 
Nicolò’s model, and from banks to depositors, such as in the charter value paradigm, tend to 
intensify. Thus, it is interesting to verify whether this risk-shifting behaviour during the crisis have 
strengthened, mitigated or reversed the relationship between banking competition and risk. Despite 
the merit of including crisis periods, we exclude the 2011 debt crisis. This debt crisis produced a 
mutual protection pact regime between high-debt governments (such as Italy) and their banking 
system affecting negatively the bank risk taking and its competitiveness (Marchionne and Fratianni 
2016). As it is difficult to control pervasive effects empirically, the inclusion of this period would 
generate significantly biases in our results. 
By way of preview, we find a negative relationship between bank market power and risk 
supporting the charter value paradigm, while we find no evidence for the risk-shifting theory or for 
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 From 2006 to 2010, the total number of banks decreased from 793 to 760. Some merger deals involving the major 
Italian banks such as the merger between Banca Intensa and San Paolo in 2006, Unicredit and Capitalia and BPU and 
Banca Lombarda (now UBI Banca) in 2007, and Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Banca Antonveneta in 2008. 
3
 In fact, the Italian government intervened only marginally in favour of the banking system during the global financial 
crisis (Fratianni and Marchionne 2010). 
  
a U-shaped competition-risk nexus. Then, we show that the crisis reinforced the trade-off between 
bank competition and bank fragility: Italian banks that were more subjected by competition of rival 
banks are also those banks that borne the higher risks during the crisis.  
The paper is organized as follows. The empirical model and variables are described in Section 
2. Dataset and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 3, while results are discussed in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
We propose two separate tests. The first aims to uncover the impact of bank competition on bank 
stability; the second to identify changes in this relationship over the crisis period. 
 In the first test, a risk measure of bank i at time t, Riskit, is regressed on an intercept, c, a set of 
control variables at the bank level, Xit, and two interest variables: a proxy of the competition level, 
Competitionit, capturing the market power of bank i, and a dummy Crisist controlling for the 
financial crisis. All independent variables are lagged one period to avoid causality problems except 
the dummy Crisis. The test is formalised as follows: 
 
Riski,t = c + β·Competitioni,t-1 +γ·Crisist + λ·Xi,t-1 +  ui,t ,         (1) 
 
where uit denotes a well-behaved error term. β<0 supports the risk-shifting paradigm of the 
competition-stability model in which banks with market power apply higher increases in interest 
rates to firms making their defaults more likely and, hence, the banking sector as a whole weaker. 
Instead, β>0 is consistent with the charter value paradigm: according to the competition-fragility 
view, a higher market power reduces the banking competition that, in turn, decreases bank risk, 
making the banking sector more stable. When β is statistically not different from zero, there is no 
dominant paradigm.  
The second test checks whether the competition-stability relationship was affected by the 
financial crisis. We estimate the following equation: 
 
Riski,t = c + β·Competitioni,t-1 +γ·Crisist + δ·Competitioni,t-1·Crisist + λ·Xi,t-1 +  ui,t.        (2) 
 
The only difference with respect to equation (1) is the introduction of an interactive term between 
Competition and Crisis. It identifies the marginal impact of the financial crisis on the competition-
stability relationship. A statistically insignificant δ or δ=0 shows that the crisis does not change the 
competition-stability relationship and the same relationship holds before and during the crisis. A 
significant δ>0 is consistent with the charter value paradigm and indicates that the erosion of profit 
margins during the financial crisis made banks with lower market power riskier than in the standard 
pre-crisis period. A significant δ<0, instead, suggests that the financial crisis promotes the risk-
shifting paradigm. As the financial crisis raised the systemic risk and led firms to herding behaviour 
in terms of risk-taking, a higher correlation in loan defaults increases the risk of banks charging 
higher interest rates and supports the risk-shifting paradigm during the financial crisis.  
 We use Altman Z-score as dependent variable. It is a weighted sum of five financial ratios 
(working capital to total assets, earnings to total assets, earnings before interests and taxes to total 
assets, the market-to-book value, and sales to total assets). This index measures the distance from 
insolvency: the higher Z-score, the lower the probability of firm insolvency and, hence, the greater 
the firm stability (Roy 1952). We prefer the original version to the modified Z-score by Laeven and 
Levine (2009) because our sample period is short and the latter drops the initial and final year. 
We employ the Lerner index to measure the market power, an inverse proxy of banking 
competition. This index is equal to the ratio of the difference between the average revenue (proxied 
by the ratio of total operating income to total assets) and the marginal costs estimated using a 
  
translog cost function on the average revenue; see Table 1. We apply an OLS estimator to the 
translog cost function year by year over the period from 2006 to 2010 to control for potential shocks 
due to the financial crisis.4 The Lerner index presents four advantages with respect to alternative 
measures of market power such as Herfindahl index, market share and other standard concentration 
measures: 1) it is a measurable indicator at the bank level; 2) it captures not only the impact of 
pricing power on the asset but also the funding side of the bank; 3) it fits well with the theoretical 
model; 4) it does not require the geographical market to be defined (Beck et al. 2013). 
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Our dummy Crisis is equal to 1 for 2008, 2009 and 2010, 0 otherwise.5 We consider 
alternatively dummy Crisis being equal to 1 for 2009 and 2010, 0 otherwise as the effect of the 
crisis could be observed with delay on bank accounting data (Fratianni and Marchionne, 2009, 
2010). We control also for other bank-specific determinants of the stability-competition 
relationship. The vector Xi,t-1 consists of six variables characterising the bank’s business model 
(Beck et al. 2013; Meslier et al. 2016): 1) the share of wholesale funding in total funding, FUND, 
which captures diversification and flexibility of the funding structure, 2) the loans to assets ratio,  
LOAN, as a measure of the assets mix, 3) the share of non-interest income in total income, NOINT, 
                                                 
4
 We get similar results by estimating the translog function over the whole period adding time dummies (results 
available upon request). 
5
 The first signs of the crisis emerged in 2007 in the US, but Italy was affected in 2008 (Laeven and Valencia, 2010) 
  
as a measure of the revenue composition; 4) the natural logarithm of total assets, ln(TA), as a proxy 
for bank size; 5) the loan loss provisions to interest income, CREDIT, as a measure of credit risk, 
and 6) the annual growth rate in total assets, GROWTH, as an indicator of market opportunities and 
the bank’s risk attitude. We also include the Tier 1 capital ratio, TIER1, to control for regulatory 
capital requirements and potential constraints to the banks’ business model. 
 
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Our data set consists of 2,687 observations from 748 banks over the period from 2007 to 2010 for 
the current variables and from 2006 to 2009 for the lagged ones. Data are from the Italian Banking 
Association.6 Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics. The LOAN distribution has a tail on the left 
suggesting that few banks have a low ratio of loans to total assets. Other variables are right-skewed 
(not reported) with mean much larger than median for Zs, FUND, GROWTH and TIER1. Hence, not 
only do few banks take large risks, but also few banks (not necessarily the same) have a higher 
share of wholesale funding, grow quicker and show a higher Tier1 capital than other banks. LOAN, 
ln(TA), and FUND show a low variability due to their higher persistence over time. Also LERNER 
standard deviation is relatively low with respect to its mean, suggesting that the market power 
changes but only gradually. On the contrary, TIER1, GROWTH and Zs varies considerably in the 
sample. This great variability could be exacerbated by the short sample period and the attrition 
problem caused by missing values in control variables.  
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 Due to the crisis, mergers and acquisitions affect our sample: for example, Banca Intesa and Sanpaolo IMI, two of the 
largest Italian banks, enter separately in the ABI dataset for 2006 and jointly from 2007 on. We treat banks separately 
until the date of merger or acquisition because consolidating or splitting the bank balance sheet before or after a merger 
or acquisition respectively, would introduce a certain degree of arbitrariness and possibly generate severe bias. The 
basic principle behind an M&A deal is that two banks together are more valuable than two separated banks. To seize 
synergies, the new bank has to restructure the business and hence it can hardly be considered equivalent to the sum of 
the old two separated banks.  
  
 
We split the sample into pre- and post-crisis period using 2008 as the first year of the crisis in 
Panel B and 2009 in Panel C. In both the panels, the one-sample mean-comparison test and the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test show that Zs and LERNER are statistically different in mean and median 
respectively during the crisis, except for the Zs mean. Differently from the cross-country analysis 
by Beck et al. (2013), common national level variables, endogenous accounting variables, and the 
short period prevent us from applying an IV estimator to single country data due to the lack of good 
instruments. We apply OLS, FE and RE models.  
 
4. FINDINGS 
Our main results are presented in Table 3 (using 2008 as first crisis year) and Table 4 (using 2009 
as first crisis year). In Table 3, the natural logarithm transformation smooths out the highly skewed 
Z-score distribution. The interest variable is the yearly Lerner index. In all estimates, we control for 
FUND, LOAN, NOINT, lnTA, CREDIT, GROWTH and TIER1 and apply robust clustered standard 
errors to correct for the effects of heteroskedasticity. The first column reports the OLS estimate. 
β>0 indicates that when the bank’s market power increases, the reduction in banking competition 
makes banks less risky and, in aggregate, the banking system more stable. This result supports the 
traditional charter value paradigm. The impact of the financial crisis on bank stability is negative 
and very significant as expected: γ<0 shows that Altman Z-score has decreased since 2008, 
suggesting that the financial crisis makes the banking system more unstable.  
 
 *+

$,
-

&&'-

;
6 GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG)GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG

 GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG GGGGGGGGGGGGGG

GGGGGGGGGGGGGG
2

 " 2 12 " 2 12
615"2 ! $ & ? A @

     "21721 !+&@>9CCC !+!B?BCCC !+$=!>CCC =+B=B&CCC =+A?9$CC =+@$AACCC
1 *=+?$B9CCC *=+??&ACCC *=+??9?CCC *=+9&BACCC *=+99?$CCC *=+9ABBCCC
1C"21721
  
=+9$=9CCC =+9@>?CCC =+9$$>CCC


     :7; *=+$!?!CC =+=$A& *=+=B&9 *=+$!?@CC =+=?$! *=+=9>A
"7 *=+$@?9CCC =+!>@! *=+&B?@CCC *=+$?B@CC =+$?$? *=+&A?=CCC
77	 =+?!=@CC *!+=?A?CCC *=+!!B@ =+?$BACCC *=+>@B>CCC *=+=B?A
"	 *=+==9? *=+$A99CC *=+==B@ *=+==@> *=+$@@@CC *=+==>!
12;	 *=+&9AACCC *=+$@9BCCC *=+&B@!CCC *=+&999CCC *=+$9&?CCC *=+&>=?CCC
81/	< =+===ACCC *=+===! =+===?CCC =+===ACCC *=+===! =+===ACCC
	21! *=+===! *=+====CCC *=+===! *=+===! *=+====CCC *=+===!


 *$+>$>&CCC =+?&9B *$+@$B?CCC *$+9=9=CCC =+9B=! *$+?=!&CCC
5%2
  ' '  ' '

 $&&A $&&A $&&A $&&A $&&A $&&A
1*,  =+$!! =+&!= =+!>B =+$!? =+&!A =+$=!
7 %

@99 @99

@99 @99
*	
 @$+A$ $>>+& 9!A+B A9+!@ $>$+& 9?!+9
*	
H = = = = = =
5"(   &=?+>   &=9+&
5"(H$   =   =
7	2-"F122

  
 




"


)*%


%

$==@
$=!=+;
- )+

-"21721+	! 

+	 #, 
!$==B=
4+CCCE=+=!FCCE=+=AFCE=+!=FIE=+!A

  
According to our expectations, banks with higher loans to assets ratio (LOAN) and loss provisions 
to interest income (CREDIT) are more exposed to risks (lower Z-score). A higher share of 
wholesale funding in total funding (FUND) or a lower share of non-interest income in total income 
(NOINT) reduces bank risk. It also decreases (higher Z-score) when bank’s total assets grow more 
(GROWTH), but it is independent from bank size (ln(TA)). There are two explanations for this 
unexpected result. The first is that the survivorship of a large number of (relatively small) banks 
depends more on the the ability to increase and (possibly) diversify their assets than on actual size. 
The second is that we observe only surviving banks that expanded their total turnover during the 
crisis taking successfully more risk, but do not observe banks that failed or exited from the market. 
Contrary to our expectations, Tier1 capital ratio is statistically not significant. As the Tier1 capital 
ratio is a threshold requirement, it becomes relevant only if bank regulatory capital is close to the 
threshold level. 
 We add FE and RE bank effects to control potential bias in the OLS estimate. The Hausman test 
rejects RE when we force a result, but the statistics is not reliable because the asymptotic 
assumptions of the test do not hold. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange-Multiplier test reject the 
hypothesis of zero variance of bank effects, a result that is consistent with RE. As results are mixed, 
we report FE and RE estimates in columns 2 and 3 respectively. Both support the charter value 
paradigm: banking competition undermines bank stability whereas the financial crisis increased 
bank risk. However, even if R2 and F test statistics improve in FE estimate, NOINT switches sign, 
FUND, LOAN and GROWTH become insignificant, and TIER1 and ln(TA) have a negative impact 
on bank stability (column 2). Due to this pattern, we rely on the RE estimate. It confirms the OLS 
results except only for FUND and NOINT (column 3). This outcome is in line with the previous 
literature (Beck et al. 2013). In our case, the instability of control variable coefficients through 
methods could also be due to our short sample period. Nonetheless, the point estimates of our key 
coefficients continue to be very significant, stable, and consistent with OLS estimates, suggesting 
that Lerner index and CRISIS are broadly uncorrelated with unobserved bank effects. 
OLS, FE and RE estimates of equation 2 show that the negative impact of banking competition 
on stability becomes statistically more intense during the financial crisis (columns 4, 5, and 6 
respectively). Under RE, for example, the higher bank risk during the crisis is compensated by a 
higher LERNER coefficient (column 6). A positive significant and stable interactive term coefficient 
through all the methods reinforces previous results, suggesting that the negative impact of 
competition on bank stability becomes harsher during turbulent periods. Estimates of the control 
variables are consistent with those of the simple model (columns 1-3). Table 4 corroborates 
previous results using 2009 as the beginning of the crisis. Balanced subsamples mitigate the 
potential bias created by a very short pre-crisis period but accounting data could be contaminated by 
the first sign of the crisis. Despite these concerns, both OLS and RE estimates are very similar to 
the corresponding estimates in Table 3. However, FE coefficients become unstable using a longer 
pre-crisis period because the lag in reporting crisis effects with accounting data is country-specific 
and fixed effects are probably unable to control this pattern. Again, we rely on the Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrange-Multiplier test and prefer RE to FE. 
We rerun the estimates of Table 3 (i) modelling a quadratic bank competition-stability 
relationship similarly to Berger et al. (2009) to check potential non-linear effects, and (ii) adding 
and removing control variables to investigate the validity of our specification. We find that the bank 
competition-stability relationship is linear and it is robust to the definition of CRISIS and the model 
specification.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4 – Linear impact of competitiveness on risk in the Italian banking sector. Crisis starting in 2009.  
 
Dependent Variable   _________________________________ln(Zs) _________________________________ 
Specification ______________Simple______________ ______________Interactive______________ 
Estimator OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Competitiveness 
LERNER 1.0300*** -0.0210 0.4684*** 0.7136*** -0.3527# 0.1767 
CRISIS -0.3945*** -0.4600*** -0.4377*** -0.6409*** -0.6814*** -0.6482*** 
CRISIS*LERNER 0.5745** 0.5110** 0.4873** 
Controls 
FUND -0.2059* -0.1697 -0.0918 -0.2101* -0.1438 -0.0892 
LOAN -0.2451** 0.1551 -0.3618*** -0.2262** 0.2053 -0.3325*** 
NOINT 0.4580*** -0.8512*** -0.0275 0.4794*** -0.7771*** 0.0064 
Ln(TA) 0.0022 -0.1544# 0.0159 0.0019 -0.1594# 0.0151 
CREDIT -0.3508*** -0.1759** -0.3279*** -0.3532*** -0.1840** -0.3311*** 
GROWTH 0.0002** -0.0003 0.0002* 0.0002** -0.0003 0.0002** 
TIER1 -0.0001 -0.0000*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000*** -0.0001 
Constant -3.0689*** -0.5385 -2.8104*** -2.9401*** -0.3753 -2.6961*** 
Bank Effects   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 2335 2335 2335 2335 2335 2335 
R2 0.214 0.327 0.199 0.217 0.331 0.201 
Number of banks 677 677 677 677 
F-Test 56.50 223.9 708.1 51.13 207.1 706.8 
Prob F-Test>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BPLM 324.7 321.4 
Prob BPLM>chi2 0 0 
NOTES: OLS, RE and FE estimates using robust clustered standard errors of the impact of the Lerner Index (competitiveness) on Altman Z-score 
(risk) in the Italian banking sector over the period from 2006 to 2010. Dependent variable: ln(Zs). Interest variable: LERNER. Table 1 summarises 
variable definitions. The crisis dummy is equal to 1 from 2009 on and 0 otherwise. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, # p<0.15 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
The recent literature on banking has renewed the interest of economists in the competition-risk 
nexus. The traditional charter value paradigm (Keeley 1990) posits that there is a trade-off between 
banking competition and stability and predicts a positive relationship between banks’ market power 
and financial stability. The risk-shifting paradigm (Boyd and De Nicolò 2005) suggests that no 
trade-off exists because fiercer banking competition leads to lower interest rates that, in turn, reduce 
the probability of firm default and make banks safer. The standard response to conflicting 
theoretical predictions is to let the data speak but empirical evidence from cross-country data is 
ambiguous and many papers have focused on individual countries. In line with this trend, we 
explore the competition-risk nexus using a panel data set of 677 Italian banks for 2006-2010.  
 We find that (i) Altman Z-score, our measure of bank soundness, is positively associated with 
the Lerner index, our measure of market concentration and (ii) the 2008-2010 financial crisis 
reinforced the existing relationship in Italy. These findings are robust to different estimators and the 
potential lag of crisis effects in accounting data whereas we find no support in favour of a quadratic 
bank risk-competition relationship.  
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